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[Sac. No. 7429. In Bank.

Dec. 13, 1962.]

Inre DONERAL PATTERSON, a Minor. DONERAIJ
PATTERSON, Appellant, v. THE PEOPLE, Respondent.
[1] Delinquent Children-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings
-Notice.~Notice

by telephone satisfies the requirement of
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 630, thnt notice of a detention hearing
be given to a parent, since that code section expressly provides
that such notice may be given orally.
[2] Id.-Correction of Delinquency-Proeeedings-Right to Coun- .
sel.-Where .the records before a superior court sitting as.n.
juvenile court at the commencement of a hearing to determine
.whether a minor should be declared a ward of the juvenile
court and committed to the care and custody of the Youth
Authority reflected that the minor had been advised at the
detention hearing of his right to counsel and that his mother,
. who was present at the hearing on the petition that the minor
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Delinquent, Dependent and Neglected Chil.
.
MeR. Dig. References: [1] Delinquent Children, § 12(2); [2, 3]
Delinquent Children, § 12(2.1): [4, 6,7] Delinquent Children,
§ 12(5); [5] Criminal Law, § 564(6).
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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be declared a ward of the court, had been advised of the right
to counsel in the notice of hcaring personally served on her,
and where no request had Leen made by either the minor or
his mother for the appoinhncnt of connsel, tl1l1 judge was justified in proceeding with the hearing without again advising the
minor or his mother of the right to counsel.
ld.-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings-Right to Counsel.-The juvenile court had no obligation to appoint counsel
for a minor charged with entering a dwelling with intent to
commit theft in a. hearing to determine whether such minor
should be declared a ward of the. court and committed to the
care and custody of the Youth Authority, despite the requirement of Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700, that counsel be appointed
for a minor in such a hearing in e.very case where the minor's
parent or guardian is indigent if the minor is charged with
misconduct that would constitute a felony if committed by an
adult, since the statute also provides that such an appointment
is mandatory only if the parent or guardian desires the appointment of counsel and the minor's parent had not indicated
any desire for counsel.
ld.-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings-Evidence.-A
judgment declaring a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court
and committing him to the care and custody of the Youth
Authority was supported by the probation officer's report relating to the minor's activities and by the fact that when the
minor appeared before the juvenile court, the charges against
him were. read and he admitted their truth in open court.
Criminal Law-Evidence-Corpus Delicti.-Testimony of an
accused at his trial admitting the truth of the charges again'3t
him not only establishes the corpus delicti of the offense but
also is sufficil'nt to justify a judgment.
Delinquent Children-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings
-Evidence.-Admission by a minor of the charges against him
in open court is the equivalent of a plea of guilty and therefore raises no issue of fact and precludes the necessity for the
presentation of evidence in support of the allegations contained in A petition seeking to have him declared a ward of
the court.
ld.-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings-Evidence-Prcsumptions.-The.presumption that the trial judge properly reviewed the probation officer's report and the other records
before him at the time of a hearing to determine whether or
not a minor should be declared a ward of the juvenile court antI
committed to the care and custody of the Youth Authority was

[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 489; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed
§ 1234).
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applicable in such hearing where there was no showing that
the statutory requirements were not followed by the judge.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County sitting as a juvenile court declaring a 17-yearold boy to be a ward of the court and committing him to the
care and custody of the Youth Authority. John Quincy Brown,
Judge. Judgment affirmed.
S. Carter McMorris for Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant
Attorney General, aIld Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
McCOMB, J.-Doneral Patterson, a minor aged 17, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento
County sitting as a juvenile court, declaring him a ward
thereof and committing him to the care and custody of the
Youth Authority.
Facts: The minor was charged with entering a residence
"with the intent to commit the crime of theft, thereby violating Section 459 of the Penal Code of California."
He was taken into custody on Kovember 30, 1961. His
mother and only available parent, Opal Patterson, was given
telephonic notice of the detention hearing before the juvenile
court referee, set for December 1, 1961.
Following the detention hearing, the court by order
adopted the referee's recommendation that the minor be
committed to the custody of the county probation officer, to
be detained in the Juvenile Hall pending hearing of a petition
that he be declared a ward of the court.
Written notice of the hearing on the petition, set for December 18, 1961, was personally served on the minor's mother.
After the hearing, the juvenile court declared the minor a
ward of the court.
These questions are presented for determination:
[1] First. Was insufficient notice of the detention hearing
given to the minor's mother, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction in the juvenile court f
No. Section 630 of the Welfare and Institutions Code expressly provides that notice of a detention hearing may be
given to a parent orally. Notice by telephone satisfies this
requirement and constitutes due process of law. (Drummey

)
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v. State Board of Funeral Directors, 13 Ca1.2d 75, 80 [2]
[87 P.2d 848] ; Litchfield v. County of :Marill, 130 CaLApp.2d
806,813 [7] et seq. [280 P.2d 117].)
It is conceded that notice of the detention hearing was
personally served on the mother of the minor by telephone.
Under the foregoing rules, this constituted sufficient notice.
[2] Second. Were the minor and his parent adequately
apprised of the right to counsel?
Yes. Section 633 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires that when a minor appears at a detention hearing he,
and his parent or guardian if present, be "informed of the
reasons why the minor was taken into custody, the nature of
the juvenile court proceedings, and the right of such minor
aud his parent or guardian to be represented at every stage
of the proceedings by counseL"
An affidavit of 'Walter A. Schmidt, the referee of the
juvenile court, established that the minor was advised at the
detention hearing of the right to counsel. The minor's mother did not attend that hearing.
Section 658 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires
that notice of the hearing on a petition to declare a minor
a ward of the court be served upon all the minor's parents
and guardians whose residence addresses are known. Section
659 requires that such notice contain a "statement that the
minor, or his parent or guardian, is entitled to have his attorney present at the hearing on the petition, and that, if the
parent or guardian is indigent and cannot afford an attorney,
and the minor or his parent or guardian desires to be represented by an attorney, such parent or guardian shall
promptly notify the clerk of the juvenile court."
The mother of the minor was personally served with notice
of the hearing on the petition, which notice contained the
statement required by section 659.
Section 700 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides,
among other things, that at the beginning of the hearing on
a petition to declare one a ward of the juvenile court the
"judge shall alicertain whether the minor or his parent or
guardian has been informed of the right of the minor to be
represented by counsel, and if not, the judge shall advise the
minor and the parent or guardian, if present, of the right to
have counsel present. If the parent or guardian is indigent
and desires to have the minor represented by counsel, the
court may appoint counsel to represent the minor, and in
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such case the court must appoint.counsel if the minor. is·
charged with misconguct which would constitute a felony if
committed by un adult."
.
.
Accordingly, the judge is reqllired to ascertain at the beginning of the hearing whether the parent or the minor has
.• been informed of the right to .counsel and isthtmrequired to
advise them of such right orily if hellas ascertained that they
have not previously been informed thereof.·
.
The records· before the court at the commencement . of the
hearing reflected that the tninorhadbeen advised at the
detention hearing of the right to counsel and that his mother,
who was present at the hearing on the petition, had been advised of the right to counsel in the notice of hearing per.
.
sonally served upon her.
Once the judge had ascertaiiled· from the records then before him that the minor andhis.parent had been informed of
the right to counsel and that no request had been . made for
the appointment of counsel, he was justified in proceeding
without again advising the minor or his parent of the right
to counsel. That duty would have evolved upon him only if it
had appeared that they had not previously been advised of
such right.
[3] The minor further contends that section 700 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code requires that counsel be ap.
pointed in every ease where the parent or guardian is in.
digent if the minor is charged with misconduct which would
constitute a felony if committed by an adult.
This contention overlooks the further requirement in the .
section that such an appointment is mandatory ouly if the
parent or guardian desires the appointment of counsel. The
record is devoid of any evidence which would indicate such
a desire on the part of the minor's parent. If, as here, the
parent has not indicated any desire for counsel,the court has
no obligation to appoint counsel, and its failure to do so did
not vitiate the judgment entered.
[ 4] Thtrd. Was the minor's admission of the. chargcs
against kim the equivalent of a plea of guilty and, as such,
SUfficient to support tke judO'rncnt'
Yes. The minor argues that there was insufficient evidence
to support the judgment and that the probation officer's report was improperly admitted and considered by the court,
Rillce the report contained conclusions and hearsay. This COIltention has been held to be without merit. (In re Garcia, 201
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I
j

·Dec.1962]

IN RE PATTERSON

853

[58 C.2d 848; 27 Cal.Rptr. 10. 377 P.2d 741

Cal.App.2d 662, 664 [2] [20 Ca1.Rptr. 313] ; In re Halamuda,
85 Cal.App.2d 210,223 [192 P.2d 781].)
In addition to the report that was received in evidence
when the minor appeared before the court, the charges were
read, and he admitted their truth in open court. [5] The
testimony of an accused at his trial not only establishes the
corpus delicti of the offense but is sufficient tojustifya judgment. (People v. Hill, 2 Cal.App.2d 141, 155 [37 P.2d 849]
[hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; People v. Hudson,
139 Cal.App. 543, 544 [2] [34 P.2d 741].)
[6] It is likewise settled that the admission by a minor
of the charges against him ill open court is the equivalent of
a plea of guilty and therefore raises no issue of fact and precludes the necessity for the presentation of evidence in support of the allegations contained in the petition. (In re
Dargo, 81 Ca1.App.2d 205, 208 [4] et seq. [183 P.2d 282]
[hearing denied by the Supreme Court] ; cf. People v. Johns,
173 Ca1.App.2d 38, 42 [2,3] [343 P.2d 92].)
[7] Fourth. D·id the trial judge properly review the
report of the p1'obation officer and the other records before
him at the time of the hearing'
Yes. It must be presumed, in the absence of a showing to
the contrary, that the statutory requirements were followed
by the trial judge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 15; People
v. Downer, 57 Cal.2d 800, 817 [22 Cal.Rptr. 347, 372 P.2d
107] ; People v. Cifrino, 46 Cal.2d 284,287 [2] [294 P.2d 32] ;
In re Smith, 33 Cal.2d 797, 801 [2] [205 P.2d 662] ; 28 Cal.
Jur.2d (1956) § 5, p. 618. No showiug to the contrary was
made in the present case. Therefore, the presumption is
here applicable.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and White, J.,. concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. In my opinion
the decision herein renders superfluous and unenforceable the
provisions ,of section 700 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code l relating to the right to counsel and thus frustrates the
• Assigned by Chairman of .Judicial Council.
At the beginning of the hearing on a pctition filed pursuant to
Article 7 (commcncing with scction 6(0), the judge or clerk shall first
read the petition to those present and upon request of the minor upon
whose behalf the petition has ueen urought or upon the request of any
parent, relative or guardian, the judge shall explain any term or allega.
1"
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purpose of the Legislature to safeguard that right in the
juvenile court .
.A. judge can now "ascertain" whether the minor and his
parents have been informed of the minor's right to be represented by counsel simply by examining the records to
note whether the notices required by sections 633 2 and 659 3
were given. He nced not pJace anything on record to indicate that he has even made that examination. He need not
undertake any investigation to determine that the records
before him are correct. He need not determine whether the
absence of counsel at the hearing is the result of an intelligent
and understanding waiver of the right to counsel.
Section 700, so interpreted, becomes superfluous for no statute is necessary to impose a duty upon the juvenile court
judge to determine whether the requirements of sections 633
and 659 have been met. .A. judge necessarily has a duty in
every case, particularly when a party is 110t represented b~:
counsel (see In re Masching, 41 Ca1.2d 530, 534 [261 P.2d
251] ), to determine that the proceedings in the case accord
with statutory requirements. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.)
Section 700, so interpreted, becomes unenforceable, for if
the judge fails to examine the records to determine whether
r,eetions 633 and 659 were complied with and remains silent
as to such failure, the minor and his parents are without a
remedy. It will be presumed that the examination was made,
tion contained therein and Ule nature of the hcaring, its procedures, amI
possible consequences. The judge shall ascertain whether the minor or
his parent or guardian has been informed of the right of the minor to 1)e
represented by counsel, and if not, the judge shall ad"ise the minor and
the parent or guardian, if present, of the right to have counsel present.
If the parent or guardian is indigent and desires to have the minor
represented by counsel, the court may appoint counsel to represent the
minor, and in such case the court must appoint counsel if the minor is
charged with misconduct which would constitute a felony if committed
by an adult. The court may rontinue the hearing for not to exceed sevcn
days, as necessary to make an appointment of counsel, or to enahlc
counsel to acquaint himself with the case, or to determine whether the
parent or guardian is indigent and unable to afl'oru counsel at his own
expense. "
'Section 633 provides that upon his appearance nt the detention hc~rillg
the minor and h.is parent or guardian, if present, "shall first be illforl1IC 11
of ••• the right of such minor and his parent or guardian to be repre·
sented at every stage of the proceedings I,y c(lunsel."
'Section 6;:;9 providcs that the notice to the parent or guardian of the
court hearing to determine wardship must contain" a statement that the
minor, or his parent or guardian, is entitled to ha\'c his attorney present
at the hearing. • • ."
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absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, which the minor
and his parents will ordinarily bc unable to make:'
. The California Juvenile Court Law of 1961 was the product of years of extensive study and criticism of juveuilc court
procedures. The charge that in their informal procedures
juvenile courts were sacrificing fundamental procedural
rights of the offender was a matter of national concern,fi Extensive studies of the California juvenile courts were ulldertaken by a special commission appointed by the Governor,
and a more limited study of wardship and the right tocounsel by the California Law Revision Commission. These studies
found that many judges believed that attorneys had no place
in juvenile court proceedings 6 and that a majority of judges
did not inform the minor or his parents of their right to
representation by counseJ.7 They concluded that legislation
was nccessary to compel judges to inform the minor and his
parents of this important right.s Many of the provisions enacted by the Legislature, including those before us in this
case, were taken verbatim from the recommendations of the
Governor's Commission. Section 700 is thus part of a comprehensive plan of remedial legislation, enacted after careful
study and drafting. Under these circumstances, it is evident
that it was the Legislature's purpose to make section 700 a
"The Report of the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile
Justice (1960) part II, pages 12-14, and a Stanford Law Review study
(see Note, The California Juvenile Court (1958) 10 Stan. L. Rev. 471,
500-501) noted the extreme hostility of some judges to the participation
of attorneys in juvenile court proceedings. The statute before us was
enacted because of the undesirable results of that hostility. In the light
of this background, it cannot be assumed that appellate court supervision
will not be necessary to ensure that the purpose of section 700 is fully
accomplished. Under today's decision, however, such supervision is
impossible.
·See e.g., Senate Com. on the Judiciary, Juvenile Delinquency, S. Rep.
No. 430, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); United States Dept. of Health,
Education & Welfare, Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing with
Children (19.34); Ellrod & Melany, Juvenile Justice: Treatment Of'
Travesty? (1950) 11 U.Pitt. L. Rev. 277; 0 'Neil, Criminal Law (1951)
Mercer L. Rev. 46; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender (1957)
41 Minn. L. Rev. 547; Note, Due Process in the Juvenile Courts (1952)
2 Catholic U. L. Rev. 90.
-Report of tte Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Jus.
tice (1960) part I, p. 13; Note, The California Juvenile Court, supra,
10 Stan. L. Rev. at p. 500.
'Report of the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Jus·
tice (1960) part I, p. 26; ld. part II, p. 12.
'Report of the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice (1960) part I, p. 26, 72-73; 3 Calif. L. Revision Com'n Reports
(1960),p. E6.
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onc alld that an illtHprl'tatioll that rcnders it UIlnecessary and Ullcnforceahle frustrates that purpose.
'rIte Governor's COlllmission, which drafted the exact wOl'ding of section 700, stated that "in our opinion, all judges
should be required to inform the miuornlld his pan'lIb of
this right [to counsel] as a routine part of the juvenile eomt
procedure." (Part I, p. 26; accord, 3 Calif.L. HeyisiOll
Com. Report (1960), p. E6.) Although the minor ll1a~r be
personally informed of the right to eoullsl'l at the detention
hearing and a parent may be given written notice of the right,
they are not informed of that right by the judge at the hearing to determine wardship when the judge docs not utter a
word about it. Indeed, n parent would not be informed of
the right by any judge unless the parent had been present
earlier at the detention hearing.
In part II of its report (page 14), the Governor's Commission quotes with approval from Shioutalwn v. District of
Columbia (D.C.Cir. 1956.) 236F.2d666, 670: "{W] here
that right [to counsel] exists, the court must be assured that
any waiver of it is intelligent and competent." (Accord,
People v. Chesser, 29 Ca1.2d 815 [178 P.2d 76, 170 A.L.R.
246].) Obviously the court cannot be assured of that fact
simply by noting that the form notice delivered to the parent
contains a statement that the juvenile has a right to be represented by counsel. There is no assurance that the notice
was read, that the parent was able to read, or if he could
read that he understood what representation by counsel
meant. Even if the minor was personally informed at the
detention hearing of his right to counsel, there is 110 assurance that any waiver, whether express or inferred, as in this
case, from his appearance at the hearing unaccompanied by
counsel, was "intelligent and competent." The Governor '8
Commission noted the irony of regarding minors as incompetent in financial matters and yet assuming their competence
to make important legal decisions "which may involve a
drastic curtailment of the minor's freedom and liberty."
(Part I, p. 27.) Only by carefully questioning the minor
could a judge ascertain that the minor's waiver of counsel
was intelligent and competent. {See Williams v. Illiff
(D.C.Cir. 1944) 142 F.2d 91.)
., Ascertain" means "to find out with certainty." (\Veb8ter's New World Dictionary of the American Language.)
What can the judge find out with certainty if he need only
examine the recitals in the records before him f Even if the
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recitals in the records are correct, he can only discover that
a written notice was given the parents and that a statement
was made to the minor. There is no meaningful sense in
which it can he said that someone is informed "of the right
to representation hycounsel" unless he understands the
meaning and significanceoL that right. To "ascertain"
if he has been so "informed" the judge must "find out with
certainty" whether he has ,an intelligent comprehension of
the right.
In my opinion. the purpose of the Legislature in enacting
section 700 and the language it used to express that purpose
require the judge at the outset of the hearing personally to·
find out by examining the .minor and his parents or guardian,
if present, whether they have been informed of the minor's
right to representation by counsel and whether they wish
the aid of counsel.. Iuperforming that duty the judge must
also make certain that they understand the nature of the
charge and its possible. consequences and that if they cannot
afford to employ counsel, the court can appoint counsel, if
the charge is or· felony proportions.
The judge's duty to protect the rights and interests of the
minor is particularly significant when a right as vitally important as the right to representation by counsel is at stake.
That duty is not discharged when the judge does not even
mention that right or show enough interest to question the
juvenile or his parent or guardian to ascertain whether the
. right to counsel is understood and has .not been waived
through ignorance or misunderstanding. The burden such
inquiries place on the judge is minimal when compared with
the risk of misinformed waiver and the consequent loss to
both the minor and the judge of the aid that counsel can give
them in the discovery of the truth and if necessary the formulation of plans of rehabilitation.
Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 9,
1963. White, ,J.,. participated in place of Peek, J., who
deemed himself disqualified. Traynor, J., Peters, J., and
. Tobriner, J., were of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
.

• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

